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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
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Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial 
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HONORABLE BENJAMIN SIMPSON 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MOLLY HUSKEY 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
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) SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 38106 
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Date: 10/2010 First Judicial District Court - Bonner County User: PHILLI 
Time: ROA Report 
Page 1 of 5 Case: CR-2O1O-OOO1O14 Current Judge: Benjamin R. Simpson 
Defendant Koivu, Randy Paul 
State of Idaho vs. Randy Paul Koivu 
Date Code User Judge 
3/5/2010 NCRF FORELL New Case Filed - Felony Magistrate Court Clerks 
PROS FORELL Prosecutor assigned Shane L. Greenbank Magistrate Court Clerks 
CMIN FORELL Court Minutes Barbara Buchanan 
Hearing type: In Custody, 1st Arraignment 
Hearing date: 3/5/2010 
Time: 1:18 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Jola Farell 
Tape Number: Ct Rm #2 
Defense Attorney: 
Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
AFPC FORELL Affidavit Of Probable Cause Barbara Buchanan 
CRCO FORELL Criminal Complaint Barbara Buchanan 
ARRN FORELL Arraignment/ First Appearance Barbara Buchanan 
JLBS FORELL Jail Booking Sheet Barbara Buchanan 
NOTR FORELL Notification of Rights Barbara Buchanan 
APER FORELL Defendant: Koivu, Randy Paul Appearance Barbara Buchanan 
Public Defenders 
JLIS FORELL Jail Information Sheet Barbara Buchanan 
BSET FORELL BOND SET: at 50000.00 Barbara Buchanan 
3/8/2010 HRSC FORELL Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 03/17/2010 Barbara Buchanan 
01:30 PM) 
FORELL Notice of Hearing Barbara Buchanan 
NOAP TURNBULL Notice Of Appearance, request for timely Barbara Buchanan 
preliminary hearing, motion for bond reduction & 
notice of hearing 
RQFD TURNBULL Defendant's Request For Discovery Barbara Buchanan 
BNDS TURNBULL Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 50000.00 ) Barbara Buchanan 
3/9/2010 NTDF TURNBULL Notice to Defendant Barbara Buchanan 
3/10/2010 RQFD TURNBULL Plaintiffs Request For Discovery Barbara Buchanan 
RRFD TURNBULL Plaintiffs Response To Request For Discovery Barbara Buchanan 
DRCQ AYERLE Driving Record Requested Barbara Buchanan 
3/11/2010 RQFD TURNBULL Defendant's First Supplemental Request For Barbara Buchanan 
Discovery 
RRFD TURNBULL Defendant's Response To Request For Discovery Barbara Buchanan 
3/12/2010 SUBC TURNBULL Substitution Of Counsel, Whitney to Payne Barbara Buchanan 
NOAP TURNBULL Notice Of Appearance, request for timely Barbara Buchanan 
preliminary hearing, motion for bond reduction & 
notice of hearing 
RQFD TURNBULL Defendant's Request For Discovery Barbara Buchanan 






. 1 PM 
Page 2 of 5 
First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2O1O-OOO1O14 Current Judge: Benjamin R. Simpson 
Defendant: Koivu, Randy Paul 
User: PHILLIP 
State of Idaho vs. Randy Paul Koivu 
Date Code User Judge 
3/16/2010 RRFD TURNBULL Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request Barbara Buchanan 
For Discovery 
3/17/2010 RRFD TURNBULL Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request Barbara Buchanan 
For Discovery 
CTLG AYERLE Court Log- 3 Barbara Buchanan 
OADC AYERLE Order Holding Defendant To Answer To District Barbara Buchanan 
Court 
INFO AYERLE Information Barbara Buchanan 
CMIN AYERLE Court Minutes Barbara Buchanan 
Hearing type: Preliminary 
Hearing date: 3/17/2010 
Time: 1 :50 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Susan Ayerle 
Tape Number: 3 
Defense Attorney: Linda Payne 
Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
PHWV AYERLE Hearing result for Preliminary held on 03/17/2010 Barbara Buchanan 
01:30 PM: Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound 
Over) 
HRSC AYERLE Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/District Court Steve Verby 
04/05/2010 09:00 AM) 
MODQ OPPELT Motion To Disqualify Pursuant to I.C. R. 25 - Steve Verby 
Judge Verby 
3/18/2010 MODQ OPPELT Motion To Disqualification Without Cause John T. Mitchell 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a) - Judge 
Mitchell - Alternate Judge 
3/19/2010 ORDQ OPPELT Order To Disqualification Without Cause John T. Mitchell 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a) - Judge 
Mitchell - Alternate Judge 
DISA OPPELT Disqualification Of Judge - Automatic - Judge John T. Mitchell 
Mitchell - Alternate Judge 
3/22/2010 ORDQ CMOORE Order Disqualifying Judge (Verby) Steve Verby 
DISF CMOORE Disqualification of Judge Verby - Self Steve Verby 
CHJG CMOORE Change Assigned Judge District Court Clerks 
HRVC CMOORE Hearing result for Arraignment/District Court held Steve Verby 
on 04/05/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated -
May be reset upon reassignment of judge 
3/29/2010 ORDR OPPELT Order of Reassignment John T. Mitchell 
CHJG OPPELT Change Assigned Judge Benjamin R. Simpson 
HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/District Court Benjamin R. Simpson 
04/26/2010 03:30 PM) 
OPPELT Notice of Hearing Benjamin R. Simpson 





Page 3 of 5 
First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2O1O-OOO1O14 Current Judge: Benjamin R. Simpson 
Defendant: Koivu, Randy Paul 
State of Idaho vs. Randy Paul Koivu 
Date Code User 
4/26/2010 CMIN OPPELT Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Arraignment/District Court 
Hearing date: 4/26/201 O 
Time: 3:55 pm 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Joann Schaller 
Minutes Clerk: Linda Oppelt 
Defense Attorney: Linda Payne 
Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Arraignment/District Court held 
on 04/26/2010 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Joann Schaller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less Than 100 Pages 
ARRN OPPELT Hearing result for Arraignment/District Court held 
on 04/26/2010 03:30 PM: Arraignment/ First 
Appearance 
PNGJ OPPELT Hearing result for Arraignment/District Court held 
on 04/26/2010 03:30 PM: Plea of Not Guilty, Set 
for Jury Trial 
PLEA OPPELT A Plea is entered for charge: - NG 
(I 37-2732(C)( 1) Controlled 
Substance-Possession of) 
4/29/2010 HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
06/28/2010 02:30 PM) 
OPPELT Notice of Hearing 
5/27/2010 CONT OPPELT Hearing result for Status Conference held on 
06/28/2010 02:30 PM: Continued 
HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
06/28/2010 01:30 PM) 
OPPELT Amended Notice of Hearing (Time of Hearing 
Changed) 
6/8/2010 FIOC OPPELT File Out Of County 
6/28/2010 CMIN AYERLE Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 6/28/2010 
Time: 2:21 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Susan Ayerle 
Tape Number: 1 
Defense Attorney: Linda Payne 
Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Status Conference held on 
06/28/2010 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Val Larson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less Than 100 Pages 
FIRT OPPELT File Returned -3-
User: PHILLIP 
Judge 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Date: 10/2010 First Judicial District Court - Bonner County User: PHILLI 
Time: ROA Report 
Page 4 of5 Case: CR-2O1O-OOO1O14 Current Judge: Benjamin R. Simpson 
Defendant: Koivu, Randy Paul 
State of Idaho vs. Randy Paul Koivu 
Date Code User Judge 
7/8/2010 HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Benjamin R. Simpson 
07/27/2010 09:00 AM) 
OPPELT Notice of Hearing Benjamin R. Simpson 
7/9/2010 MISC PHILLIPS Authority in Support of Motion to Suppress Benjamin R. Simpson 
7/13/2010 NOFH PHILLIPS Notice Of Hearing - Sept 1, 2010 Benjamin R. Simpson 
HRSC PHILLIPS Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Benjamin R. Simpson 
09/01/2010 03:00 PM) Defs Motion to Suppress; 
Kootenai County 
7/15/2010 FIOC OPPELT File Out Of County- Judge Simpson Benjamin R. Simpson 
7/20/2010 WAIV OPPELT Waiver Of Speedy Trial Benjamin R. Simpson 
STIP OPPELT Stipulation to Vacate Status Conference Benjamin R. Simpson 
ORDR OPPELT Order Vacating Status Conference Benjamin R. Simpson 
HRVC OPPELT Hearing result for Status Conference held on Benjamin R. Simpson 
07/27/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
7/26/2010 FIRT OPPELT File Returned Benjamin R. Simpson 
8/16/2010 FIOC OPPELT File Out Of County- Judge Simpson Benjamin R. Simpson 
8/19/2010 RESP CMOORE State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Benjamin R. Simpson 
Suppress 
STIP CMOORE Stipulations for Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Benjamin R. Simpson 
Suppress 
8/30/2010 STIP OPPELT Stipulation to Forgo Oral Argument on Benjamin R. Simpson 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
9/1/2010 HRVC OPPELT Hearing result for Motion to Suppress held on Benjamin R. Simpson 
09/01/2010 03:00 PM: Vacated 
GRNT OPPELT Hearing result for Motion to Suppress held on Benjamin R. Simpson 
09/01/2010 03:00 PM: Motion Granted Kootenai 
County 
9/8/2010 FIRT OPPELT File Returned Benjamin R. Simpson 
9/14/2010 HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Benjamin R. Simpson 
10/25/2010 01:30 PM) 
OPPELT Notice of Hearing Benjamin R. Simpson 
~/17/2010 NOTC PHILLIPS Notice of Appeal Benjamin R. Simpson 
APSC PHILLIPS Appealed To The Supreme Court Benjamin R. Simpson 
:J/28/2O10 CINF PHILLIPS Clerk Information - had to place on reopen status, Benjamin R. Simpson 
as ISTARS automatically put as Inactive, but a 
hearing is set in front of Simpson, so want to keep 
on Open Status. No administrator available to 
enter password to revert to prior status 
CCOA PHILLIPS Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Benjamin R. Simpson 
MISC PHILLIPS sending Clerk's Certificate and certified Benjamin R. Simpson 
documents to Supreme Court 
I 0/14/2010 FIOC OPPELT File Out Of County - Judge Simpson Benjamin R. Simpson 
-11-
Date: 10/2010 First Judicial District Court - Bonner County User: PHILLI 
Time: ROA Report 
Page 5 of5 Case: CR-2O1O-OOO1O14 Current Judge: Benjamin R. Simpson 
Defendant: Koivu, Randy Paul 
State of Idaho vs. Randy Paul Koivu 
Date Code User Judge 
10/20/2010 NOTC SMITH Notice of appeal filed ISC 10/1/10 - Docket no. Benjamin R. Simpson 
38106-2010; due attorneys 11/01/2010; due 
Supreme Court 12/06/2010 
MOTN SMITH Motion for appointment of state appellate public Benjamin R. Simpson 
defender 
ORDR SMITH Order appointing state appellate public defender Benjamin R. Simpson 
ORPD PHILLIPS Defendant: Koivu, Randy Paul Order Appointing Benjamin R. Simpson 
Public Defender Court appointed Molly Huskey 
10/25/2010 DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Status Conference held on Benjamin R. Simpson 
10/25/2010 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Joann Schaller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less Than 100 Pages 
ADVS OPPELT Hearing result for Status Conference held on Benjamin R. Simpson 
10/25/201 O 01 :30 PM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
CMIN OPPELT Court Minutes Benjamin R. Simpson 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 10/25/2010 
Time: 1:33 pm 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Joann Schaller 
Minutes Clerk: Linda Oppelt 
Defense Attorney: Linda Payne 
Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
10/27/2010 ORDR OPPELT Order Denying Stay on Appeal Benjamin R. Simpson 
10/28/2010 MISC SMITH Miscellaneous - Document filed ISC - Order Benjamin R. Simpson 
Appointing State Appellate Public Defender 
11/1/2010 MISC PHILLIPS "Clerk's Certificate Filed" - received Clerk's Benjamin R. Simpson 
Certificate of Appeal back from Supreme Court 
11/2/2010 HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Benjamin R. Simpson 
01/24/2011 01:30 PM) 
HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 3 Days Benjamin R. Simpson 
01/25/2011 09:00 AM) 
OPPELT Notice of Trial Benjamin R. Simpson 
11/8/2010 MISC PHILLIPS Notice from Supreme Court - document filed - Benjamin R. Simpson 
State's Motion to Stay Underlying Proceedings 
(' 7 r' -· ~·- ," ... ! r-\ •• 
v Ir--./ 1 • ,) :- , , j !· r·' 0 
r'\ "'If 1.,, _ \, ,- _ IL \ J 
- L.L,v:i I ; Ur BnNIJEK~ ·-/::OST }1,··,·~·' - n ' ' ·' ·· ;_::, ~:r,L DISTRICT 
20/0 MAA -5 p I: 25 
BONNER COUN1Y PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
127 S. First Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-6714 
(208) 263-6726 (facsimile) 
Assigned Prosecutor: 
SHANE GREENBANK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF BONNER 







Case NO: CR-2010-1014 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
AGENCY: BCSO 
COMES NOW, Shane Greenbank, and being first duly sworn under oath, and 
complains that the above named defendant did commit the crime of: POSSESSION 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, METHAMPHETAMINE, a Felony, LC. §37-
2732(c)(1), and §19-2514, committed as follows: 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - 1 of 3 
-0-
That the Defendant, RANDY PAUL KOIVU, on or about the 5th day of March, 
2010, in the County of Bonner, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess a controlled 
substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and 
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
WHEREFORE, Complainant prays that the Defendant be dealt with according 
to law. r 
DATED this ti' day of March, 2010. 
ENBANK,DPA 
COMPLAINANT 
---SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of March, 2010. 
MAGISTRATE OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - 2 of 3 
-'7-
PART II 
The Prosecuting Attorney further informs the Court that while committing the 
Felony offense alleged above, the defendant, RANDY PAUL KOIVU, had been 
previously convicted of two (2) separate felony offenses and, pursuant to I.C. §19-2514, 
is properly considered a persistent violator. Defendant's previous convictions consist of 
the following felony offenses: 
1) On or about the 26th day of August, 2002, a judgment of guilty was 
entered in the State of Idaho, County of Boundary, in Case No. CR-
2002-92 for the Felony offense of: BURGLARY. 
2) On or about the 6 th day of January, 2004, a judgment of guilty was 
entered in the State of Idaho, County of Boundary, in Case No. CR-
2003-677 for the Felony offense of: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case 
made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Idaho. 
/A 
DATED this£ day of March, 2010. 
CRIMINAL COMPIAINT - 3 of 3 
ENBANK, ISB# 7845 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
-.?-
ZOIO MAR - 5 P 1 : 2 5 
IN THE DISTRCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT o;~::~:~~~.ut?f 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Court Case Number(s): CR- r::l.O/t? - IOI'/ 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RANDY PAUL KOIVU, 
DOB
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
SSN: Incident #: 10-003169 
Defendant. 
I, Deputy B. Martin, the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say that: 
1) I am a duly appointed, qualified, and acting peace officer in the State of Idaho and am employed 
by Bonner County Shericc's Office; 
2) I am the same person whose name is subscribed to the attached Citation(s), if any. 
3) The Defendant was identified by: 
D Military ID D State ID Card D Student ID Card D Credit Card 
cgJ Driver's License D Paperwork found D Verbal ID by defendant 
D Identified by witness: __ . 
4) The Defendant is currently: 
D not in custody. 
cgJ in custody. 
5) I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime(s) of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), a Felony per I.C. 37-2732(c)O). 
because of the following facts: 
[NOTE: You must I) clearly articulate the facts regarding every element of the off ense(s) for 
which you believe PC exists; 2) why it is believed that the Defendant committed the 
offense(s); and 3) state the source of all information provided - stating what you observed 
and what you learned from someone else, and identifying such persons below]. 
On 03-05-2010, at approximately 0146 hours, Deputy Deal and myself were riding together 
in his patrol car for the night. We were running radar at the Conoco gas station at the north 
end of the long bridge. We noticed a vehicle traveling northbound at a high rate of speed. I 
visually estimated the vehicle to be traveling at 40 MPH in a posted 25 MPH zone. Deputy 
Deal confirmed with radar that the vehicel was traveling at 38 MPH. 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT - 1 of 4 -1-
A traffic stop for speeding was initiated and the occupants were contacted. The driver was 
identified as Randy Koivu by his Idaho Drivers license. Also in the vehicle was Jason Bilbo 
and Chad Tompkins. 
Dispatch advised that Koivu had a misdemeanor warrant and Bilbo had a felony warrant. 
Both warrants were confirmed by dispatch, and Koivu and Bilbo were taken into custody on 
the warrants and transported to the Bonner County jail. 
When we arrived at the jail, I handed Koivu over to the jail staff, Deputy Miller and Deputy 
Van Pelt. I stood by as Deputy Van Pelt had started his search. I noted that prior to the 
search, the floor at Koivu's feet was clear of any foreign objects. As Koivu was removing his 
socks, Deputy Van Pelt noticed a small clear plastic bag with black tape on the floor at 
Koivu's feet. I asked Koivu what it was, he responded that he did not know. Koivu said it 
must have been stuck to his shoe. I picked the bag up from the floor and could tell it was 
some kind of controlled substance. 
[If a drug offense has been committed, briefly explain your trammg, experience and 
qualifications to identify the substance and/or paraphernalia at issue] 
Drug recognition and NIK test training from POST academy. 
[If a drug offense has been committed, explain what tests were performed and what the 
results were] 
At my request, Deputy Deal retrivied a Methamphetamine test kit from his vehicle. The kit 
was a NARK II, a product of the Sirchie Group. The test was performed and the result 
showed positive for Methamphetamine. 
6) The events described above, which give rise to the criminal offenses believed to have been 
committed, occurred on or about the date(s) of 03-05-2010, in: 
[8J The City of __ , County of Bonner, State ofldaho; 
[8J Bonner County, State of Idaho. 
7) Based on the investigation detailed above (complete all that apply): 
D Uniform Citation number __ was issued to the Defendant for the offense(s) of __ . 
D Uniform Citation number __ , attached hereto, has not been served on the defendant, 
0 A Complain/Summons is requested. 
0 An Arrest Warrant is requested because: __ . 
C8]" A request for the filing of a Criminal Complaint has been made upon the 
Prosecutor's Office for the offense(s) of: Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine), a Felony per LC. 37-2732(c)(l ). 
8) The following documents are attached hereto and are incorporated by reference: 
D Copy of Protection Order D Copy of NCO D __ 
ST ATE OF IDAHO 




By my signature, and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I 
hereby solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached reports and 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT- 2 of 4 
documents that may be included herein truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to the best of my 
information and belief. 
DA TED this _i_ day of f'...-"1-1'2<: if lof o , ___ . 
SUBSCRIBED MTJ> SWORN to before me this S-,lt day o~ , c&)/ b . 
\,,,, .. ,,,,, 
,,, JOH~',.,. 
,''-1t. i)_- .. . . . . . ",, 
$ C, .• •• ~ 
~ ~ : 01,S,.V ·. ,:. 
-<ii{·~ • -
=z: ·-- : = - - -C ·.o-·. pue\.' .:~E 
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The above-named Defendant having been charged with, or arrested for, the offense(s) of: Possession of a 
Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), a Felony per I.C. 37-2732(c){l). and the court having 
examined the affidavit of Deputy B. Martin, and any attached documentation, the Court finds a substantial 
and factual basis for believing that the offense(s) has/have been committed and that the Defendant 
committed it/them. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
D a Criminal Summons may be issued for the above-named Defendant, giving the 
Defendant a date certain to appear before the Court. 
D a Warrant may be issued for the arrest of the above-named Defendant, or, if he has been 
arrested without warrant, that the Defendant may be detained and that he may be required 
to post bail prior to his release. 
DATED this 5 day of __ _.'1_0_~_)-__ , _2_U_\~ 
MAGISTRATE COURT JUDGE 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT - 4 of 4 
ST E OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONI'. l. VS 
CASE#: CR- 2010-1014 NAME: RANDY P. KOIVU 
NOTIFICATIOJ\ OF RIGHTS: 
CR-2003-677 (BOUNDARY CO) 
CASE CALLED 109,118 to 119, 121 DATE: 3-5-10 TIME: 1:15 
CR TM: #2 JUDGE: BUCHANAN CLERK: FORELL 
SHANE GREENBANK 
FAILURE TO APPEAR: 
D Defendant having failed to appear, and good cause not shown for such absence 
IT IS ORDERED: 
8 Bench Warrant Issued $ Bond Bond Forfeited Referred to Prosecuting Attorney for probable cause to issue arrest warrant 
PROCEEDINGS AND ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS: CHARGE AMENDED: 
P. M. 
X Defendant is informed of the charges against him/her and all legal rights, including the right to be represented by counsel. 
X Defendant advised of maximum penalties and penalties for subsequent violations. 
Defendant waives right to counsel and understands Hire own attorney. 
X Defendant sworn. 
X Public Defender appointed: BCPD 
Court denies court appointed counsel. Defendant waives right to Public Defender 
Matter continued to: at 
PRELIMINARY HEARING: M Statutory time waived 
~ Set preliminary hearing 
Preliminary hearing waived 
14 days 21 days 
JUDGE ENTERS PLEA OF NOT G.UILTY 
Set for Pre-Trial Conference and Jury Trial Set for Court Trial 
ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA: 
Defendant enters plea freely and voluntarily with knowledge of consequences. 
Defendant is advised of rights waived on plea of guilty and understands 
Defendant denies that any threats or promises have been made. 
Pleas of guilty accepted by the court 
• Set for SENTENCING on: at Judge: 
I Defendant ordered to obtain alcohol evaluation prior to sentencing date 
BAIL: 







Case/cnt: § Released on own recognizance Remanded to the custody of the Sheriff Released on bond previously posted 
Warrant of Attachment $ 
INDEX SPEAKER 
Days jail in lieu of fine/costs 
PHASE OF CASE 
-/.3-
CASE NO. XX DATE: 
ARRAIGNMENT COURT LOG - IN CUSTODY FIRST APPEARANCE 
CR-2003-677 
CR-2010-1014 




BONNER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Janet K. Whitney (ISBN: 6624) 
406 South Ella Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 255-7889; Fax: (208) 255-7559 
S1AfE UF ILJ,".l·W 
~.OUNTY OF BONNEf~ 
·:· l ii ":.'I; I_ [I Is TR IC I 
2[110 HAR -8 P J: Sb 
i··'.1\:~rID'fl ~:COTT 
r· I r ;, I.' i: ,·:!T ) I c·, ·r ro Ll"l' 
\ '"- ..__,\i\ I..-'' ..... I ' V I t\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST.JBDIClA,~-.DJSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NUMBER CR-10-0001014 
) 
V. ) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, 
) REQUEST FOR TIMELY 
RANDYP. KOIVU, ) PRELIMINARY HEARING, 
) MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION 
Defendant. ) & NOTICE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW the Office of the Bonner County Public Defender, and pursuant to court 
appointment hereby appears for and on behalf of the above named defendant in the above entitled 
matter, and requests that a preliminary hearing be scheduled in accordance with the time limits 
set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 5 .1. 
Counsel hereby moves for reduction of the bond set in this matter on the grounds that it is 
excessive, and further, notice is hereby given that counsel will present argument in support of 
the motion to reduce bond at the time of the preliminary hearing scheduled in this matter if the 
defendant is in custody. 
Notice is given that the Defendant herewith asserts all rights accorded him or her under 
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under 
Article I, § 13 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho and all prophylactic measures imposed 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, REQUEST FOR TIMELY PRELIMINARY HEARING, 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION & NOTICE OF HEARING Page 1 
-It/-
upon the State pursuant to said constitutional provisions; including, but not necessarily limited 
to, the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. 
Notice is further given that the Defendant herewith demands and asserts all State and 
federal statutory and constitutional rights to speedy trial of this matter. 
DATED this I day of March, 2010. 
OFFICE OF THE BONNER 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
/ tl-u..et UJfiuf-~__,, 
TK. WHITNEY 
,/ 
IEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fo~l\.g was personally served by placing a 
copy of the same in the interoffice mailbox on the _O_ '_ 'day of March, 2010, addressed to: 
Shane Greenbank 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, REQUEST FOR TIMELY PRELIMINARY HEARING, 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION & NOTICE OF HEARING Page 2 
Linda J. Payne 
Anomey at Law 
P.O. Box 1017 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
(208) 665-1303; (208) 2ss~1sss 
(208) 667-8292 FAX 
ISB#6222 
ZOIO MA.A I 2 A 11: I R 
----:f: .. CJ}·-·· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F1RST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE or IDAIJO, ) 
) CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
) 




NOTICE IS HEREBY GJVEN that Linda J. Payne, Attorney at Law, shall be and hereby 
is substituted as counsel of record for the above-named defendant, in the place and stead of 
JANET WHITNEY and the BONNER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE. 
Any and all further notices and pleadings should be addressed and delivered to said 
attorney, Linda J. Payne. at the address stated above. 
DATED this /;r.,. day of March, 2010. 




NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION 01-" COUNSI.L • I 
BY:~ L , A. 'JI;. ~
-10-
1, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a trUe and correct copy of the foregoing this /a::::<Jay of March, 20 l 0, 
by placing a copy of same in the Counhouse Mailbox of: 
Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney 
Bonner County Public Defender 
NOTICI: OF' SUIIIITrnmON OF COUPfSEL • 2 
- /7 -
~ 
~ - , ,,, . 
J,.. 1 
C ) 




ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1017 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816 
(208) 665-1303; 255-7555 
(208) 667-8292 FAX 
ISB #6222 
20IO MAR 12 A II: 3S 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY PAUL KOIVU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) REQUEST FOR TIMELY 
) PRELIMINARY HEARING, 
) MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION 
) & NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, LINDA J. PAYNE, Attorney at Law hereby appears for and on behalf of 
the above named defendant in the above entitled matter, and requests that a preliminary hearing 
be scheduled in accordance with the time limits set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1. 
Counsel hereby moves for reduction of the bond set in this matter on the grounds that it is 
excessive, and further, notice is hereby given that counsel will present argument in support of 
the motion to reduce bond at the time of the preliminary hearing scheduled in this matter if the 
defendant is in custody. 
Notice is given that the Defendant herewith asserts all rights accorded him or her under 
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under 
Article I,§ 13 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho and all prophylactic measures imposed 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, REQUEST FOR TIMELY 
PRELIMINARY HEARING, MOTION FOR BOND 
REDUCTION & NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
upon the State pursuant to said constitutional provisions; including, but not necessarily limited 
to, the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. NO AGENT OF THE STATE OR 
PERSON ACTING IN SUCH CAPACITY IS TO QUESTION THE DEFENDANT IN 
REGARD TO ANY ACT, WHETHER CHARGED OR UNCHARGED. 
Notice is further given that the Defendant herewith demands and asserts all State and 
federal statutory and constitutional rights to speedy trial of this matter. 
DA TED this __ /.~h~-- day of March, 2010. 
.PAYNE 
for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _f_g.y of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person in the following manner: 
Shane Greenbank, Dep. PA Bonner Co. [ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
[ ] Facsimile No. ------n Courthouse Mail Other: ---------
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, REQUEST FOR TJMELY 
PRELIMJNARY HEARJNG, MOTION FOR BOND 
REDUCTION & NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
-/9-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




BARBARA A BUCHANAN 
MAGISTRATE COURT 
SUSAN A YER LE 
CASE NO. 
DATE: MAR 17 2010 TIME: 1:30 PM 
CLERK: 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner 
Atty: SHANE GREENBANK 




vs RANDY PAUL KOIVU 
Defendant / Respondent 
Atty: PUBLIC DEFENDER 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
PHASE OF CASE 
150 Calls Case 
Present: I DEF WITH LINDA PAYNE; SHANE GREENBANK FOR STATE 
J CHARGE 
LP PREPARED TO WAIVE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
HAVE DISCUSSED 





J ACCEPT WAIVER ADVISE AND ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
RELEASE CONTINUES ON BOND 
APRIL 5TH AT 9 AM TO ENTER PLEA 
MAKE SURE YOU'RE HERE 
SG INFORMATION FILED 
152 END 
CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 -d,{)DA"rE: 3-17-2010 Page 1 of 1 
COURT MINUTES - PRELIMINARY HEARING 
IN THE DISTRICT CvJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT L,, THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 








Case No. CR-2010-;t@l;fHY C 
FiR:::·· .11.1'.". • • 
C 
" 
Plaintiff, ORDER HOLDING 
vs. 
RANDY PAUL KOIVU 
DEFENDANT TO AN~f~AR I 7 p 2: 0 0 
DOB: I , f 
Defendant 




held in this case on the ___ day of ___ ~----• 2010 , 
waived, the Defendant having entered a plea of GUILTY and executing the same in writing, a copy 
of which is on file herein; 
and the Court being fully satisfied that a public offense has been committed, and that there is probable or 
sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant be held to answer to the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, to the charge(s) of: POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, METHAMPHETAMINE, IC §§37-2732(c)(l), 19-2514 
a felony committed in Bonner County, Idaho, 
on or about the 5th day of _;;.;.M=a-=-r...;c--'-'h:._ ____ , 20 10 
between the ___ day of , 20 __ ~ and the ___ day of 
________ ,20 __ _ 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
(
('){) Defendant appear for ARRAIGNMENT on \ S \ () at 9: 00 a. m.; 
1 ~ A Presentence Investigation be conducted; Defendant is to contac Probation & Parole within five 
(5) days of the date herein and APPEAR FOR SENTENCING IN DISTRICT COURT on the 
___ day of _________ , 20 __ , at ____ m.; 
In the courtroom of the above entitled Court, before the Honorable Steven C. Verby. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
p<~ Defendant's release is continued on the bond posted. Defendant's release on his own recognizance is continued. 
( ) YOU, THE SHERIFF OF BONNER COUNTY, IDAHO, are commanded to receive him/her, the 
said defendant, into your custody and detain him/her until he/she is legally discharged. Defendant 
is to be admitted to bail in the sum of$ ________ . 
DATED this \\ day of h 0 r:J:::--__ , 20 10 . ~
~~ . 
Magistrate 
COPIES TO: [~ATTY l,t<Jl DFT ,'.? TTY FOR DFT. [ ) BCSO 
DATE: 6 --C-=t-(cJ -J/--~-~--__,_ ___ ,DeputyClerk 
] PROB/PAROLE 
ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER 7/09 
f .. ··~ 
zom H~R \ 1 P 2: Go 
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
127 S. First Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-6714 
(208) 263-6726 (facsimile) 
Assigned Prosecutor: 
SHANE GREENBANK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




Case NO: CR-2010-1014 
INFORMATION 
AGENCY: BCSO 
COMES NOW, Shane Greenbank, and complains that the above named 
defendant did commit the crime of: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, METHAMPHETAMINE, a Felony, LC. §37-2732(c)(1), and §19-2514, 
committed as follows: 
INFORMATION - 1 of 3 
That the Defendant, RANDY PAUL KOIVU, on or about the 5th day of March, 
2010, in the County of Bonner, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess a controlled 
substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 
PART II 
The Prosecuting Attorney further informs the Court that while committing the 
Felony offense alleged above, the defendant, RANDY PAUL KOIVU, had been 
previously convicted of two (2) separate felony offenses and, pursuant to LC. §19-2514, 
is properly considered a persistent violator. Defendant's previous convictions consist of 
the following felony offenses: 
1) On or about the 26th day of August, 2002, a judgment of guilty was 
entered in the State of Idaho, County of Boundary, in Case No. CR-
2002-92 for the Felony offense of: BURGLARY. 
2) On or about the 6 th day of January, 2004, a judgment of guilty was 
entered in the State of Idaho, County of Boundary, in Case No. CR-
2003-677 for the Felony offense of: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case 
made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Idaho. 
WHEREFORE, Complainant prays that the Defendant be dealt with according 
to law. 
DATED this 
INFORMATION- 2 of3 
~ I Z day of March, 2010. 
• 
REENBANK, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / 7 day of March, 2010, I caused to be seived a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to the following: 
Original - Court File 
L, f'tf"" e J ttR&t d1itney 
Chief Depttcy Public Defender 
Hand Delive_wd A 
ftffv . .,.,,,_ ~ r.,,.. ,,,.. ~ 
INFORMATION - 3 of 3 
... 
LINDAJ. PAYNE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1017 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816 
(208)665-1303;255-7555 
(208) 667-8292 FAX 
ISB #6222 
20!0 MAR 11 f' I= 5~ 
; 
:· .. < .!:. ~~: DTT 
·:.:.:·,~-' I T/,~f 1 T COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RANDY PAUL KOIVU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 
) FEL 
) 
) MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 





COMES NOW the defendant, RANDY PAUL KOIVU, by and through the undersigned 
attorney, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25, and hereby moves the Court for an Order 
disqualifying the Honorable Steve Verby in this matter. This motion is not made to hinder, delay 
or obstruct the administration of justice. 
DATED this /1 day of March, 2010 . . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a 
true copy in the Courthouse mailbox on the /J day of March, 2010, addressed to: 
Bonner County Prosecutor By ~
MOTION -1 
BONNER COUN1Y PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
SHANE G REENBANK (ISB #7845) 
20!0 MAR I 8~P I: 21.l 
r '. ;\ • ~ : ::_ •. CC) T 1· 
127 S. First Avenue , C ' ~- re ' (' '1 ~ l-, I in •1· . .. _ r\ ~- 1 :..j i ~ 1 0 ~- .- u r\ 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
(208) 263-6714 
···-- ____ , , -
-; :,'.! I { 
(208) 263-6726 (Fax) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 








CASE NO.: CR-2010-1014 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
WITHOUT CAUSE PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 25(a) 
COMES NOW the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney and pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 25(a) hereby moves the Court to Disqualify the Honorable John Mitchell, District Judge 
in the above entitled matter. 
DATED this / / ---..---
E GREENBANK, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE 
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 25(a) - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ~-day of March, 2010, I caused, to be served, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to: 
Linda Payne - fax'd 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1017 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1017 
~
Legal Assistant 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOlIT CAUSE 
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 25(a) - 2. 
Judge Mitchell - fax'd 
District Judge 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Mar.19.2010 8:50AM Fr''"OLANDER HAYNES MITCr1ELL STOW
03 .: .::JUNl'CH LUUNfl t'twi>t:CUTOk 1.i:uc,.i:c,,,c,1.a, /1£ 
STATE OF iC/:..HU 
COUNTY OF BONNEi< 
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. 
ZOIO MAR I 9 A 10: 3 2 
, 
HA (IE SC01, .. 
CLERK !STRICT COUR f 
PUTY 
IN THE DISrRICf COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'IY OF BONNER 








CASE NO.: CR-2010-1014 
ORDER FOR DISQUAUFICATION 
WITHOUT CAUSE PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 25(a) 
UPON motion filed pursuant to !.C.R. 25(a), the undersigned District ,Judge now 
disqualifies himsel£ 
IT .IS HEREBY ORDER.ED that the Honorable Judge John T. Mitchell is 
disqualified from presiding over all proceedings in this matter. 
DATED this 
ORDER FOR DlSQUALIFICA.TI0NWffll0OT CAUSE 
PURSU.ANT 'IO I.C.R 25(a) - 1 
, 2010, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of· · l1u. t1,b-. , 2010, I caused, to be 
served, a tme and correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to: 
Shane Greenbank 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
~emaiH,ox Ptt'(~J Z ~3-Cf&,Ct 
8m1dpomt, ID 
ORDER FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE 
PURSUANT TO I.C.R.. 25(a) - a. 
LindaPayne 
Attorney at Law . 
P.O. B8X 1017 r c; x. (" d l i Y. (;(p t· t l Cj Z, 
Coettl d'Alene, ID 838:16-1017 
LINDA J. PAYNE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1017 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816 
(208) 665-1303; 255-7555 
(208) 667-8292 FAX 
ISB #6222 
STATE Di:- ;:1 /. ::, . 
COUNTY OF 8-0~i~(EP 
FIRST .JUDICIAL DIST. 
1.0/0 MAR 2?. p ~: 5 2 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY PAUL KOIVU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 
) FEL 
) 






The Court having before it the Motion to Disqualify} M@ ~9oe cau3c apfHPP@, now, 
therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Steve Yerby 1s disqualified from 
presiding over all proceedings in this matter. 
DATED this 22ntl....aay of March, 2010. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Joregoing was personally served by placing a 
copy of the same via courthouse mail on the ;.. 3 f" day of March, 2010, addressed to: 
Linda J. Payne 
Bonner County Prosecutor 




Mar.29. 2010 10:45AM F8JEDLANDER HAYNES MITCHE~L STOW No.1678 P. 1/3 
IN THE 01sTRJCT couRT oF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRicecM,#"8~ WtNHNaER 




CASE NO CR 2010-1014 
ZOID HAR 2q A II: SI 
MARI seal i 










ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT 
RA..1"DY PAUL KOIVU, 
Defendant. 
The Honorable Steve Yerby, having been disqualified pursuant to TCR 25{a) now, 
therefore, 
1T IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above matter is reassigned to the Honorable 
Benjamin R. Simpson, District Judge, for the disposition of any pending and further 
proceedings. 
IT IS F1JRTHER ORDERED that the following alternate judges are hereby assigned to 
preside in this case· Charles Hosack, Fred M Gib1er, Lansing Haynes, John P Luster and 
George R Reinhardt, ill. 
DATED trus.2il_day of (Vlal'J.h , 2010. 
JOHNT. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the)j_day of H41-'VL , 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was sent via facsimile, to the following.· 
ShQ~ Crc~bca,k .Fax.eel 
Lrhdc. PCt'fh\- ·ht rJ 
}G ~ . ~ ~ 7- ~ )-9 ). 
ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT· l 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 







STA TE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 





CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 
DATE: 4-26-10 TIME: 3:30 
' COURTROOM 1 
vs RANDY PAUL KOIVU 
Atty: SHANE GREENBANK 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS ARRAIGNMENT 
Defendant / Respondent 
Atty: LINDA PAYNE 
INDEX SPEAKER PHASE OF CASE 
3:55 J Calls Case 
Present: I SHANE GREENBANK, DEFENDANT, LINDA PAYNE 
J CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE AND HABITUAL 
OFFENDER. PLEA? 
LP NOT GUILTY. 
P.M. 
. 





CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 
COURT MINUTES 
WARRANT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION. THE STATE FILED A 
MOTION TO DISMISS IN THAT CASE. IF SIGNED THEN I WOULD FILE A 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
SET FOR PRETRIAL AND JURY? 
STATUS CONFERENCE. 
SET JUNE 28'". 
ENTER NOT GUil TY PLEA. 
SET FOR STATUS CONFERENCE FOR JUNE 28'". 
END 
._, ?.J, '1 -
'~ ~ 
DATE: 4-26-10 Page 1 of 1 
JUDGE: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




BENJAMIN R SIMPSON 
JOANN SCHALLER 
SUSAN A YERLE 
DISTRICT 
CASE NO. 
DATE: JUN 28 2010 TIME: 1:30 PM 
CLERK: CRTRM: 1 
DIVISION: 
STATE OF IDAHO vs RANDY PAUL KOIVU 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner 
Atty: SHANE GREENBANK 
SUB~IECT OF PROCEEDINGS 
CHARGE 
Defendant I Respondent 
Atty: LINDA PAYNE 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
INDEX SPEAKER PHASE OF CASE 
221 J Calls Case 
Present: I DEF WITH LltmA PAYNE; SHANE GREENBANK FOR STATE 
J ARRAIGNMENT LAST WEEK; LAST MONTH 
BEING ARRAIGNED TODAY 
LP NO, HAS BEEN ARRAIGNED 
ISSUE IN THIS CASE, JUDGE VERBY ISSUED WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST ON 
CASE HE HAD ALREADY TOPPED OUT HIS PRISON TIME 
AS A RESULT OF THAT WARRANT, CLIENT ARRESTED 
STATE GOING TO DO RESEARCH SEE IF DISMISS 
SG PREFERENCE WOULD BE HAVE REVIEWED THE ISSUE 
WOULD LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF AND ARGUE; ANTICIPATE AN 
HOUR TO ARGUE 
J SET IN THE ORDINARY COURSE 
LP STATE WILL NOT OBJECT TO UNTIMELY MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
J FUTURE COURSE OF SETTING HEARINGS 
224 J RESET ORDINARY COUR5i= 
224 END 
CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 DATE: 6-28-2010 Page 1 of 1 








Jul 20 10 10: 25a L' -Ja J Pa::ine 
0712012010 10:03 F.U 2082554~ _ 
208 ~67 8292 
Staples 572 Sandpoint.ID llJOOl 
STATE Ci~ /Ji, , :J 
COUNTY OF BOHNER 
F"IRST JUDICIAL 01ST. 
LINDA J. PA \'NE 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Bo:1 1017 
Coeurd'AleneID 8381~1017 
(208) 66S-JJ03; 155-7555 
(208) 667-8292 FAX 
ISB#6222 
ZOiO .JUL 20 A 11:08 
CLERR'Oi~~'i'CouH r 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FJRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTV OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO. CR2010-1014 
Plaintiff, ) 
) WAIVER OF SPEEDY 
vs. ) TRIAL 
) 




I, the above-named defendant, RANDY P. KOJVU, have talked with my attorney, 
Linda J. Payne, about my constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. A speedy 
trial means that I must be brought to trial within six months of the entry of my not guilty 
plea, or the matter may be dismissed. I am not in custody on this matter. I understand 
that I retain my right to have a speedy trial in the felony matter, the six month da1e 
beginning on the date the Information was filed. Having this rieht and lhese mets in 
mind, I hereby voluntarily and intelligently waive my right to a speedy trial in the above-
entitled matter. 
DATED this7-J?-~CJ day of July, 2010. 
RANDY P. KOIVU 
WAIVER OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT- Paga I 
p. 1 
Jul 20 10 10:25a L. 1a J Pa~ne 208 ~67 8292 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person in the following 
manner: 
Bonner County prosecuting Attorney via fax 
WAIVER Of SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT - Page 2 
p.2 
J U I, U. L V I V :, ; JO MIVI .- - v U 11 
, Froa: 1Dl6 CClJHTV PROSECUTOR 
II O , 1 0 0 J r , I 
ST AT t CW I ' i .··. ; , . l f'\r I'•• 
COUNTY OF BOtm~f< 
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. 
?.0/0 .JUL 2 I A 9: O 2 
ClER~''IJ'i~Tt1~Ull i 
DEPUTY 
IN TBB DJS'l'BICf COVKT OF THE IUST .JUDICIAL DIST.RICI' OJl'THB 
STAT.& OF IDAHO, IN AND POR. TBB COUN'ITOP BONNER 
RA.TB OF ID.ABO, ) 
) 
PJain1:iit } CASE NO. CR--2010.1014 
) 
'YI, ) ORDER VACATING 
) STA.TVS CON.FERENCE 
RANDY PAUL XOIVU~ ) 
) 
Ddm41m:. ) 
PmlUIDt to Stipulation to Vacate Statua Conference filed herein; 
lT IS HEREBY ORDllllED that the Status ConfereDce cmrmtly scheduled for 
July~7, 11010, at 9:00 a.m. !I VACATED. 
DATBDthie lf) day of July, 2010. 
' 
I herebycertiiytbat on the _-6..L day of July, 2010, I cau,ed,, tD be MVUcJ. a true 
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Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-6714 
(208) 263-6726 (facsimile) 
Assigned Prosecutor: 
SHANE GREENBANK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RANDY PAUL KOIVU, 
Defendant. 
Case NO: CR-2010-1014 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
COMES NOW, Shane Greenbank, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for 
Bonner County, State of Idaho, and hereby submits State's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
POSTURE 
Counsel for the defendant has moved to suppress this matter on the 
following basis: Because the District Judge in Boundary County lacked 
jurisdiction to issue the Warrant of Attachment in CR-03-677, the Warrant was 
issued without probable cause; therefore, Koivu was unreasonably 
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seized/arrested in Bonner County in this matter; therefore, his person was 
unlawfully searched; therefore, the fruits of the search are subject to suppression 
through application of the exclusionary rule. The State argues that the evidence 
is not subject to suppression, and requests the defendant's motion be denied. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. The Exclusionary Rule Would Not Apply In This Case Under 
The U.S. Constitution. 
II. The Exclusionary Rule Should Not Apply In This Case Under 
The Idaho Constitution. 
A. The Exclusionary Rule Under The Idaho Constitution 
Should Be Co-Extensive With The Exclusionary Rule 
Of The Fourth Amendment. 
1. First Guzman Flaw: 
2. Second Guzman Flaw: 
B. Suppression Of Evidence Would Be Improper Under 
Idaho's Exclusionary Rule. 
1. First Interest: "remedy for unreasonable 
Searches and Seizures" 
2. Second Interest: "encouraging thoroughness in 
the warrant application process" 
3. Third Interest: "preventing an 'additional 
constitutional violation"' 
4. Fourth Interest: "preserving judicial integrity"' 
FACTS 
The necessary facts are contained in the separately filed "Stipulations For 
Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress". 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Exclusionary Rule Would Not Apply In This Case 
Under The U.S. Constitution. 
Where the conduct of the officer is objectively reasonable, a defendant is 
not entitled to suppression of evidence. 
In United States v. Leon, the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether suppression of evidence was appropriate where the police 
had relied upon a facially valid warrant. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The court first 
noted that its precedents did not require exclusion of evidence as a remedy for all 
Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 905-06 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465 (1976)). Nor is suppression a right guaranteed to the individual, but is rather 
a judicially created remedy crafted for its deterrent effect. Id. at 906 (citing 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974)). 
The Court further recognized that exclusion of evidence is a remedy that 
exacts "substantial social costs" as it impedes the truth finding processes of the 
judicial system, which often results in the guilty going free or receiving reduced 
sentences. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. When applied to actions of law enforcement 
taken in good faith or where the violation was minor, "the magnitude of the 
benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal 
justice system" and can generate disrespect for the law and the administration of 
justice. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08. Thus, the exclusionary rule should be applied 
only "'where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."' 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 910, quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
Assuming that the exclusionary rule ever has the desired effect of 
discouraging misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to 
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19. 
Application of the exclusionary rule "'necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right.'" Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U.S. 433,447 (1974). Once an officer has obtained a warrant, there is nothing 
more the officer can do to comply with the law and, therefore, "[p]enalizing the 
officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute 
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to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. 
Thus, the Court held, "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by 
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a 
subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 
Exclusion of evidence from the execution of an invalid search warrant is 
only appropriate where the magistrate was misled by information the affiant 
knew was false or provided in reckless disregard for its truth; where the issuing 
magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role"; where probable cause was so 
lacking that "official belief in its existence [ was] entirely unreasonable"; and 
where the warrant was so facially deficient that the executing officers could not 
reasonably presume that it was valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. 
Leon's "good faith" analysis has been applied by the Court m other 
contexts as well. In Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995), Evans was arrested on 
an outstanding warrant and his car searched incident to his arrest. It was later 
learned that the arrest warrant had been quashed 17 days previously, but the 
court failed to notify law enforcement, so the warrant still showed as valid in 
computer records. Id. at 4-5. Concluding that the officer's conduct was 
reasonable, and the error was committed by court employees who would not be 
deterred from improper conduct by suppression of evidence, the Court concluded 
that suppression was not warranted under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 14-16. 
Recently the Court decided Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 698 
(2009), in which Herring had been arrested on the basis of an arrest warrant that 
appeared in computer records maintained by law enforcement in a different 
county, but a search of the actual records after arrest showed the warrant had 
been recalled. The Court held that suppression of evidence of illegal possession 
of a controlled substance and a firearm was not required because the police 
conduct did not rise to the level of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct, or ... recurring or systemic negligence." Id. at 702. Suppression is not 
called for, the Court held, when the police mistakes are the result of simple 
negligence rather than systemic errors or recldess disregard of constitutional 
requirements. Id. at 704. 
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In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342-44 (1987), a police officer inspected 
the yard and records of a licensed dealer in automotive parts and scrap pursuant 
to an Illinois statute allowing such searches, and ultimately arrested three people 
for possession of stolen cars. The Illinois statute in question was struck down as 
unconstitutional by a federal court the day after the search. Id. at 344. Applying 
the reasoning of Leon, the Court concluded that the error in that case was the 
Illinois legislature's act of passing an unconstitutional statute, and that there 
would be no deterrent effect to be gained by suppression. Id. at 349-53. The 
Court held that the officer's reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable; 
therefore the exclusionary rule did not apply. Id. at 356-60. 
The analysis of these cases applies equally as well in the case at hand. In 
this case, Deputies Martin and Deal acted entirely reasonably under the law: 
They lawfully stopped the defendant for a speeding violation; they lawfully ran 
his information through dispatch; dispatch informed the deputies that there was 
an outstanding arrest warrant from Boundary County, and dispatch confirmed it; 
neither these deputies, nor any other law enforcement officers or prosecuting 
attorneys, had any involvement in procuring the warrant; the deputies arrested 
the defendant on the warrant; and the drugs were found during the booking 
process at the jail. Indeed, the deputies did precisely what they should do when 
they discover an outstanding arrest warrant - they made the arrest. 
The essence, exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment is designed to 
deter "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct." Herring v. United 
States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 702 (2009); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984). "To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently 
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that 
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." Herring. 129 S.Ct. 
at 701-02. "[I]t cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter 
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19. 
Because Deputies Martin's and Deal's conduct were reasonable and in no way the 
product of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or ... recurring or 
systemic negligence," Herring. 129 S.Ct. at 702, the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
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II. The Exclusionary Rule Should Not Apply In This Case 
Under The Idaho Constitution. 
The state requests this Court to either adopt the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Amendment as applicable under Idaho's constitution or, in the 
alternative, to hold that exclusion would be improper under Idaho's standard on 
the facts of this case. 
A. The Exclusionary Rule Under The Idaho Constitution 
Should Be Co-Extensive With The Exclusionary Rule 
Of The Fourth Amendment. 
The state recognizes that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
was rejected by a two justice1 plurality of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992), overruling State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959 
(1989). The state respectfully submits, however, that Guzman should be 
overruled, and the law as set forth in Prestwich reinstated. Precedents of the 
Idaho Supreme Court can, and should, be overruled if it is manifestly wrong, has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling it is necessary to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Houghland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990). The Guzman opinion should be 
overruled because a review of its reasoning shows it to be manifestly wrong, and 
following persuasive reasoning of the United States Supreme Court would result 
in clarity and uniformity of the law and better meet the objectives of the 
exclusionary rule. 
Justice Bistline, in writing for the court in Guzman, reasoned that Idaho 
had adopted the exclusionary rule at a time when the United States Supreme 
Court had not made the exclusionary rule mandatory upon the states, and that 
the exclusionary rule Idaho adopted was more comprehensive than the federal 
rule. Because Idaho's exclusionary rule was designed to protect broader interests 
than preventing police overreaching, the purpose the Guzman plurality felt was 
the sole underpinning of the exclusionary rule in Leon, the Court reasoned that 
1 In State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790 (1993), a unanimous court applied Guzman, holding that it 
applied retroactively, to reverse a district court's denial of suppression. 
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Idaho's history of application of the exclusionary rule was inconsistent with 
allowing a good faith exception. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 992-93. 
The reasoning of the Guzman plurality is flawed for two reasons. First, a 
review of the Idaho cases upon which Justice Bistline relied does not support his 
conclusions. To the contrary, those cases clearly show that Idaho's exclusionary 
rule is co-extensive with the exclusionary rule as adopted and applied by the 
United States Supreme Court. Second, even assuming that the Idaho 
exclusionary rule serves the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable 
searches and seizures, deterring Fourth Amendment violation and protecting 
judicial integrity, the good faith exception as articulated in Leon is consistent 
with those purposes. 
1. First Guzman Flaw: 
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality does not 
support its analysis or results. For example, the court first relied upon State v. 
Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), the case adopting the exclusionary rule 
for Idaho. However, the court in Arregui specifically relied upon United States 
Supreme Court authority in adopting the exclusionary rule. Arregui, 254 P. at 
791. Furthermore, the court, quoting a passage from an Oklahoma court that it 
"would not attempt to improve," went so far as to say that the "'guarantees of 
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures"' in the federal and state 
constitutions "'are practically the same,"' and therefore "'it follows without 
argument that the rule of evidence in the state courts, where like facts and 
principles of law are involved, should conform to that settled by the court 
having supreme prestige and authority."' Arregui, 254 P. at 791 (emphasis 
added), quoting Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 547 (Ok.Cr.App. 1923). It is thus clear 
that the Idaho Supreme Court did not adopt an exclusionary rule for the Idaho 
Constitution different from that pronounced by the United States Supreme Court 
for the Fourth Amendment. 
Nor are the other cases relied upon in Guzman indicative that the Idaho 
Supreme Court had ever adopted an exclusionary rule broader than that 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Rauch, 
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99 Idaho 586 (1978), the court suppressed for failure to comply with the knock 
and announce statutes, relying heavily upon the "landmark case" of Ker v. 
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The only mention of the Idaho Constitution 
occurs in the quote of a dissenting opinion. Rauch, 99 Idaho at 593, quoting 
State v. Anderson, 31 Idaho 514 (1918) (Morgan, J., dissenting). There is nothing 
in the opinion that would suggest that the exclusionary rule in Idaho is broader 
than its federal counterpart. 
Likewise, in State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387 (1981), cert denied 454 U.S. 
1057 (1982), the court determined LePage's right to counsel had been violated 
under both the federal and state constitutions. The part of the opinion relied 
upon by the Guzman court for the proposition that judicial integrity is a factor in 
exclusion is actually a quote from two United States Supreme Court cases. In 
response to a claim that the issue had not been preserved by proper objection 
below, the Court stated: 
Finally, we are cognizant of the need to insure that the judiciary 
does function, and is perceived as functioning, in a manner 
consistent with the individual constitutional rights, both state 
and federal, of all who appear before the bar of justice. While the 
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is undoubtedly to deter 
police misconduct, it is also true that at some point the courts must 
simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the part of law 
enforcement agencies. "Courts ... cannot and will not be made 
party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by 
permitting unhindered use of the fruits of such invasions." Tercy v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
While "the imperative of judicial integrity" Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 222, Bo S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), may 
not be the primary reason for refusing to allow the use of 
unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, it certainly requires us to 
exercise our discretion to review alleged errors that affect 
substantial rights and are "plain" in the sense that it is evident that 
a mistake has occurred. Accordingly, we turn to an examination of 
the merits of LePage's claim. 
LePage, 102 Idaho at 391-92 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the part of the LePage opinion relied upon for the claim that Idaho's 
exclusionary rule is broader than the federal one, and therefore cannot recognize 
a good faith exception, actually states quite the opposite. The court specifically 
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referenced to both federal and state rights, drawing no distinction between them. 
The court also stated that the primary purpose of the rule is deterring police 
conduct, and the secondary reasoning is that the courts cannot be made a party to 
"certain behavior on the part of law enforcement agencies." This purpose is 
entirely consistent with a good faith exception as articulated in Leon. Finally, the 
Court does not rely upon Idaho authority for this proposition, but rather 
authority of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, nothing in the LePage 
decision indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court was adopting or articulating any 
rule different from its federal counterpart or inconsistent with the Leon good 
faith exception. 
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality shows that 
there is nothing in those cases indicating that Idaho's exclusionary rule is any 
different than its federal counterpart. To the contrary, those cases show that the 
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently looked to the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in both adopting and defining the exclusionary rule in 
Idaho law. Because Guzman misinterpreted and misapplied Idaho law, it should 
be overruled, and the Idaho exclusionary rule be interpreted as coextensive with 
exclusion as required by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
2. Second Guzman Flaw: 
The second flaw of Guzman is its contention that the Leon good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is inimical to the values of exclusion unrelated 
to police deterrence. The plurality contended that Idaho's exclusionary rule 
served the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and 
seizures, deterring police misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant 
application process, preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by 
allowing consideration of the evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993842 P .2d at 672. The United States Supreme Court 
persuasively addressed these concerns, explaining why they do not require 
suppression of evidence where the police have acted objectively reasonably. 
The Leon Court did not, as implied in Guzman, reject remedial or other 
concerns in the exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-13. The Court started 
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its analysis of exclusion as a remedy by specifically noting that exclusion is a 
court-created - not a constitutionally mandated - remedy. Leon, 468 U.S. at 
905-06. This remedy is sensitive to the costs it extracts, and is to be restricted to 
those areas "'where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-08, quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, because of those costs, tends 
to generate, not prevent, disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. Thus, the Court had previously found limitations on the 
exclusionary rule related to federal habeas corpus; grand jury proceedings; civil 
trials; where a particular defendant had no standing; in using the evidence for 
rebuttal; and refusing to adopt a "but for" standard for suppression. Leon, 468 
U.S. at 909-11. A rule that does not require suppression of evidence where the 
police have acted objectively reasonably in obtaining and executing a warrant is 
thus consistent with the limited remedial and other purposes of the exclusionary 
rule. The Idaho courts have adopted the same limitations on Idaho's 
exclusionary rule, implicitly recognizing the same balancing of the rule's costs 
against its benefits. 
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter overzealous law 
enforcement officers from violating the rights of suspects. LePage, 102 Idaho at 
391, 630 P.2d at 678. The Leon Court addressed other purposes for the 
exclusionary rule and found them inadequate to justify excluding evidence 
obtained by a police officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable in 
,obtaining and executing a search warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 921 n.22, 922. 
This authority and reasoning is persuasive, and should guide the Idaho courts in 
application of the exclusionary rule under the Idaho Constitution. 
B. Suppression Of Evidence Would Be Improper Under 
Idaho's Exclusionary Rule. 
Even under the exclusionary rule of Guzman, suppression is not warranted 
in this case. As noted previously, in rejecting the good faith exception under the 
Idaho Constitution, the Guzman Court reasoned that Idaho's exclusionary rule is 
more comprehensive than the federal rule. The Court stated that, in addition to 
deterring police misconduct, Idaho's exclusionary rule also serves the purposes of 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 10 of 13 
-!j~-
providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures, encouragmg 
thoroughness in the warrant application process, preventing an "additional 
constitutional violation" by allowing consideration of the evidence, and 
preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993, 842 P.2d at 672. Even 
assuming that Idaho has different constitutional interests in the exclusionary 
remedy than under the federal constitution, such additional interests do not 
justify suppression under situations similar to this one. 
1. First Interest: "remedy for unreasonable 
Searches and Seizures" 
The first interest identified by the court in Guzman was providing a 
remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, the officer 
conducted a lawful traffic stop for speeding; dispatch informed the officer of the 
outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant driver; the officer lawfully arrested 
the defendant on the outstanding warrant; the defendant was lawfully searched 
when he was being booked into the jail; and the Methamphetamine that was 
found as a result of the search was lawful. 
To suppress the fruits of the encounter in this case would thus provide a 
"remedy" where law enforcement officers acted well within the bounds of the law 
and where there has been not even a scintilla of unreasonable police conduct. 
Applying the exclusionary rule in this instance would "remedy" nothing, and 
instead do nothing more than work a "windfall", for a guilty criminal, further 
encourage his disrespect for the law, and that of other scofflaws. Indeed, "the 
magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic 
concepts of the criminal justice system". Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08. 
2. Second Interest: "encouraging thoroughness in 
the warrant application process" 
The Guzman Court also identified encouraging thoroughness in the 
warrant application process as a justification for rejection the good faith 
exception. This justification has no applicability to situations like this one -
where the officer arrested the defendant on an active arrest warrant, initiated and 
issued by the District Court, without law enforcement or prosecutorial 
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involvement or prompting. The officer was as "thorough" as the law expects him 
to be in such circumstances. 
3. Third Interest: "preventing an 'additional 
constitutional violation"' 
As a third justification for rejecting the good faith exception, the Guzman 
court identified an interest in preventing an "additional constitutional violation" 
by allowing consideration of the evidence. As argued above, the state submits 
that there was no constitutional violation in this case, as the officer arrested the 
defendant on an outstanding arrest warrant that law enforcement didn't have a 
hand in procuring. 
4. Fourth Interest: "preserving judicial integrity"' 
Finally, the Guzman court reasoned that Idaho's exclusionary rule serves 
the purpose of preserving judicial integrity. However, it does not preserve 
judicial integrity to forbid the introduction of relevant and competent evidence 
that was obtained in the absence of police overreaching. To the contrary, 
indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, where there has been no 
police misconduct, tends to generate, not prevent, disrespect for the law and the 
administration of justice. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the interests identified by the Court in Guzman are not served in 
situations where, as here, there is no police misconduct, the State asks that 
Guzman either be limited strictly to the context of warrant applications or that it 
be overruled entirely. The State further requests that this Court hold, consistent 
with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the exclusionary rule, 
that suppression is not required in this case because the officer's conduct was 
reasonable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this d/4~ of August, 2010. 
BANK, ISB# 7845 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (Ci,J day of August, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was caused to be faxed to Linda Payne at 208-667-8292. 
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. IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT DEPUTY 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY PAUL KOMJ, 
Defendant 
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL IDSTORY: 
CASE NO. CR-2010-1014 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
On January 6, 2004, the Defendant was found guilty of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, in Boundary County. The court ordered 3 years fixed, with 2 years indetenninate, for 
a unified sentence of 5 years, but granted 4 years of probation. As a condition of probation, the 
Defendant was ordered to pay certain fines, costs and restitution. On October 31, 2005, the court 
revoked probation, relinquished jurisdiction and remanded the Defendant to the Department of 
Corrections for service of sentence. 
Around July 2, 2009, the Defendant was discharged from prison. On October I, 2009, a 
Deputy Clerk for Boundary County filed an Affidavit and Notice of Failure to Pay, alleging that 
Defendant was late in the amount of $1,028.50 for fines, costs and public ·defender 
reimbursement. Notice of arrearages was sent to the Defendant. On December 1, 2009, the same 
1 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER 





























clerk filed a second Affidavit alleging outstanding fines and costs of $588.50, which were to 
have been paid in full by July 6, 2006. 
On December 8, 2009, Judge Verby signed a Warrant of Attachment directing any peace 
officer in the State of Idaho to arrest the Defendant and bring him before the court for contempt, 
. less he post bail in the amount of $588.50. Neither law enforcement nor prosecutors had any 
involvement in the generation of the clerk's affidavits, nor the issuance of the Warrant of 
Attachment. 
On March 5, 2010, Bonner County Sheriff's Deputies lawfully pulled over the Defendant 
for speeding. There were two other male passengers in the car. The deputies lawfully obtained 
identifying information from the three occupants, and ran the information through dispatch for a 
records check. Dispatch retwned that the Defendant and one of the other occupants had warrants 
in Boundary County. 
The deputies reasonably relied on the validity of both confomed warrants, and placed the 
Defendant and the other occupant under arrest and transported them to the Bonner County Jail. 
At the jail, the Defendant was searched prior to being placed in a holding cell. During that 
process, a baggie of Methamphetamine was discovered at Defendant's feet, and attributed to him. 
The Defendant was then arrested for felony Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine), and this case was generated. 
On April 8, 2010, the Prosecuting Attorney for Boundary Cowity filed a motion to 
dismiss the Warrant of Attachment filed on December 8, 2009. On May 4, 2010, Judge Yerby 
signed an order dismissing the Warrant of Attachment because "the Court lacked jurisdiction to 
issue the warrant on December 8, 2009." 
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The parties to this matter filed a Stipulation as to the facts herein on August 19, 2010, and 
subsequently filed a Stipulation to Forego Oral Argument on August 27, 2010. 
The Court has reviewed the files and records herein and now being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing therefore, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION: 
In State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), the district court detennined 
that a search wazTant was not supported by probable cause. However, under the "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule, as set forth in United Stales v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 
3405, 82 L,Ed.2d 677 (1984) the district court admitted evidence found during execution of the 
warrant. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court revisited the case in which the good faith exception 
was first adopted in Idaho, State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 783 P.2d 298 (1989). In revisiting 
this opinion, the Court noted that the Court of Appeals in Prestwich adopted Leon based upon 
the fact that in State v. Rice, 109 Idaho 985, 712 P.2d 686 (Ct. App. 1985), rev. den. (1986), the 
Idaho Supreme Court denied petition for review. In Rice, the Court of Appeals held that, while · 
the Court had concerns about Leon, "in light of our Supreme Court's admonition that the Idaho 
provision is to be construed consistently with the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, 
State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 650, 662 P.2d 230, 231 (1983), we are constrained [to follow the 
rule in Leon]." Rice, 109 fdaho at 989, 712 P.2d at 690. 
. Prestwich then followed the rule in Rice, predicating its decision on Nash v. Overholser, 
114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180 (I 988), in which Justice Johnson Mote: 
In my opinion, the result of the failure of this Court to grant a petition for review is that 
the decision of the Court of Appeals becomes the law of this state with regard to any new 
principles oflaw annowiced in the decision. 
3 
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Id., at 463-64, 757 P .2d at 1182-83. Thus, the Leon good faith exception was adopted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court by applying the ''review denied rule,,. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 985, 842 P.2d 
at 665. Noting the difficulties and problems that the ''review denied rule" caused, the Guzman 
Court then explicitly rejected the rule. Id The Court explained that it was not necessarily placing 
its stamp of approval upon every Court of Appeals decision when it denied review: 
There have been many instances when only two members of the Court voted to grant 
review, and also many instances where only one vote is cast to grant review. The various 
reasons for not granting review are not stated, but we have never considered that denying 
review meant any more than that for any one of various reasons there were not sufficient 
votes for reconsidering the decision of the Court of Appeals. One apparent reason for the 
rule of review denied was that. because we have considered an op~ion in question and 
the briefs, an ensuing denial thereof puts our imprint upon the opinion. No one doubts the 
sincerity of those advocating that proposition, but the consensus of the Court is that such 
denial of review has no more meaning or effect than when the Supreme Court of the 
United States denies a petition for certiorari, the denial likely being attributable to the 
ever-increasing number of petitions. Of a necessity there must be a screening process. 
Id at 986. P.2d at 665. Of course, this does not mean that decisions of the Court of Appeals are 
not precedential to trial courts; rather, the Supreme Court "has never subscribed to the view that 
our decision to not review a decision emanating from that court was tantamount to an implicit 
holding that the new case law precedent emanating from the Court of Appeals became somehow 
binding on this Court." Id 
The Court went on to determine that the good faith exception in Leon did not merit 
adoption under Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 17. As the Court explained: 
Although we do not doubt and do not challenge the United States Supreme Court's power 
to define the parameters of fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, it is equally important that the protections accorded under our state 
constitution not be diminished by a permanently pervading adoption of the federal good-
faith exception. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 989, 842 P.2d at 668. The Court extensively discussed its right to be 
instructed by the Fourth Amendment and its strictures, while still interpreting the Idaho 
4 
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Constitution to provide greater protections. Id. at 987-88, 842 P.2d 666-67. 
The Guzman Court then engaged in a lengthy analysis of Idaho State and Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, showing Idaho's shift into the exclusionary rule and the United States 
Supreme Court's shift from exclusion of evidence as a way of protecting citizens' Fourth 
A.m.endment rights, to exclusion as a mere deterrent of future unlawful police conduct. Thus, the 
Guzman court found Leon to be the "apex of this ... view of the exclusionary rule" in 
announcing a ''good faith" exception to the federal exclusionary rule. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 992, 
842 P.2d at 992. The Leon Court found that as long as the officer acted in good faith reliance, 
there was nothing to deter, and thus no justification for exclusion. Id. 
The Guzman Court took a less narrow view of the purpose of the exclusionary rule: 
[WJhile we recognize0 that the deterrence of police misconduct was a puzpose, we also 
recognized that judicial integrity mandated the exclusionary rule. See also State v. 
Johnson, 1 IO Idaho 516, 524-26, 716 P.2d 1288, 1296-98 (1986) (recognizing the 
different purposes of the state exclusionary rule). In sum the bases for our state 
exclusionary rule are the same as those set forth in Mapp and are inimical to the view 
taken by the Supreme Court in Calandra ... Additionally, we believe the exclusionary 
rule is also properly directed toward the warrant issuing process itself. We agree with 
those commentators who have noted that ''it is somewhat odd to suppose that the 
exclusionary rule was not designed to deter the issuance of invalid warrants." 
Id at 992-93, 842 P .2d at 671-72 ( citation omitted). Thus, the Guzman court disagreed with the 
United States Supreme Court's finding that the sole policy which warrants suppression under 
exclusionary rule is deterrence of illegal police behavior: 
We believe that the exclusionary rule should be applied in order to: 1) provide an 
effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable government 
search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) 
encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the judiciary 
commit an additional constitutional violation by considering evidence which has been 
obtained through illegal means; and 5) preseJVe judicial integrity. 
Id at 993, 842 P .2d at 672. Lastly, the Guzman Court disagreed with Leon's determination that 
the exclusionary rule needs to be limited because of "[tJhe substantial social costs exacted by the 
5 
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exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights ... " Guzman, 122 Idaho at 
994, 842 P.2d at 673, quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907, 104 S.Ct at 3412. First, Guzman explains 
that a cost-benefit analysis is impossible, as there is "insufficient empirical data for the costs and 
benefits of a good faith exception to be accurately assessed." Id at 994, 842 P.2d at 673, quoting 
State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 126 (Vt. 1991). The Court further explained that it is not the 
exclusionary rule that results in substantial costs; it is the FoW'th Amendment: 
Much of the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected; it is more properly 
directed at the Fourth Amendment itself .... The exclusionary rule places no limitations 
· on the actions of the police. The fourth amendment does. The inevitable result of the 
Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and its requirement 
that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause is that police officers who obey its 
strictures will catch fewer criminals .... That is the price the framers anticipated and 
were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, home, and property against 
unrestrained governmental power. 
Id at 994-95, 842 P.2d at 673-74 (citation omitted). 
The state does not pay a "cost" by being put in a worse position than before the 
constitutional violation; it is only forbidden to benefit from its error. As the state is only 
deprived of what it was not entitled to possess in the first place, to say the fourth 
amendment exacts a cost to the state is like saying that a thief pays for committing a theft 
when he is required to return what he stole. 
Id Lastly, the court explained, 
The exclusionary rule unencumbered by the good faith exception provides incentives for 
the police department and the judiciary to take care that each warrant applied for and 
issued is in fact supported by probable cause. In addition to encouraging compliance with 
the constitutional requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, ·it also 
lessens the chances that innocent citizens will have their homes broken into and 
ransacked by the police because of warrants issued upon incomplete or inaccurate 
information. We believe these are laudable effects of the exclusionary rule which appear 
to have gone unrecognized by the Leon majority. 
Id. at 998, 842 P.2d at 677. 
1. Whether the Exclusionary Rule Would Apply in this Case Under the U.S. 
Constitution 
The State first argues that under the United States Constitution and Fourth Amendment 
6 
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jurisprudence, the exclusioruny rule should not apply in this case. It is true that under Leon and 
its progeny, a good faith exception exists, and would likely be applied to this case. Here, the 
officers acted reasonably when stopping the Defendant for a traffic violation and arresting him 
based upon an outstanding warrant. Under Leon, illegal police conduct would not be deterred by 
excluding the methamphetamine found as a result of the arrest, and therefore the State is correct 
that under federal law, the good faith exception would probably apply. 
2. Whether the Exclusionary Ruic Should Apply in this Case Under the Idaho 
Constitution? 
a. Did Guzman Misapply and Misinterpret State and Federal Law? 
The State first argues that the authority cited by Guzman does not support its analysis or 
result, beginning with State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (I 927). The State argues that 
A"egui is based upon federal law, and explicitly champions conformity between state and 
federal law. Therefore, Arregui fails to hold that the state exclusionary rule adopted a rule 
different from the federal exclusionary rule. 
A"egui is the case that first adopted the exclusionary rule in Idaho. This case is cited in 
Guzman for the proposition that Idaho adopted the exclusionary rule based upon its own 
constitution, and not United States Supreme Court mandate, in that the United States Supreme 
Court did not require states to adopt the exclusionary rule at the time oftheArregui opinion. 
The State misinterprets the significance of Guzman's citation to Arregui. What was 
significant in Guzman was that the Arregui Court adopted an exclusionary rule mirrored after the 
federal rule not out of United State Constitutional or Supreme Court mandate, but of its own 
volition, under its own State Constitution: 
It should be emphasized that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to the 
states when Arregui was decided and, thus, the exclusionary rule in Idaho became based 
wholly upon the state constitution. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 
L.Ed. 1782 (1949) (the fourth amendment applies to the states, but the fourth amendment 
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exclusionary rule does not). Thus, Idaho has had an independent exclusionazy rule based 
upon the state constitution for the past sixty-five years. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 991, 842 P .2d at 670. This justification in Guzman has been affinned by 
our Supreme Court: 
Admittedly, we have previously found Article 1, § 17, in some instances, provides greater 
protection than the parallel provision in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See, 
e.g., ... State v. Guzman ... However, in these cases, we provided greater protection to 
Idaho citizens based on the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing 
jurisprudence. 
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,472, 20 P.3d 5, 8 (2001). Even more harmful to the State's 
argument is the fact that Guzman reaffirms the interpretation of the federal Constitution at the 
time of Arregui, noting that the United States Supreme Court has since diverged from this 
interpretation: 
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has abandoned the original purposes of the 
exclusionary rule as announced in Weeks and adopted by this Court in Arregui, in that the 
federal system has clearly repudiated any purpose behind the exclusionary rule other than that 
of a deterrent to illegal police behavior. Thus, the change in federal law has provided an 
impetus for a return by this Court to exclusive state analysis. · 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993, 842 P .2d at 672. 
The State next argues that other cases cited in the opinion in Guzman also show that 
Idaho has not previously adopted an exclusionary rule broader than that articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court. However, the state mischaracterizes the purposes for which these cases 
are cited. State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586,593,586 P.2d 671, 678 (1978) is cited for its holding 
''that evidence illegally seized must be suppressed because to admit it would constitute an 
independent constitutional violation by the court in addition to the violation at the time of the 
illegal search." Guzman, 122 Idaho at 992, 842 P.2d at 671. It is not cited as authority that 
Idaho's exclusionary rule is historically broader than the federal rule. And, in fact, whether 
Idaho's exclusionary rule was historically broader is inapposite to the question of whether Idaho 
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must adopt federal exceptions to previously implemented remedies for search and seizure 
violations. 
Lastly, the State herein uses State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391-92, 630 P.2d 674, 678-79 
(1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606, 70 L.Ed.2d 595 (1982) to show that Guzman 
improperly characterizes and relies on Idaho precedent for its holding that Idaho's exclusionary 
rule is broader than the federal rule. The State's argument is based on the fact that LePage cites 
federal cases in its holding, and LePage makes no distinction between state and federal rights. 
Thus, the State argues, "nothing in the LePage decision indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court 
was adopting or articulating any rule different from its federal counterpart or inconsistent with 
the Leon good faith exception." 
LePage is cited in Guzman, stating "while we recognized that deterrence of police 
misconduct was a purpose, we also recognized that judicial integrity mandated the exclusionary 
rule," Guzma11, 122 Idaho at 992, 842 P.2d at 671. While LcPage does cite federal law, it also 
clearly states: 
[W]e are cognizant of the need to insure that the judiciary does function, and is perceived 
as functioning, in a manner consistent with the individual constitutional rights, both state 
and federal, of all who appear before the bar of justice. While the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is undoubtedly to deter police misconduct, it is also true that at some 
point the courts must simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the part of law 
enforcement agencies. 
LePage, 102 Idaho at 391,630 P.2d at 678. Thus, LePage clearly stands for the proposition for 
which the Guzman Court cites to it. More telling and more importantly, however, LePage's 
reliance on federal law, and Guzman's reliance on Le Page, cannot possibly show approval of the 
good faith exception in Leon, as the Leon opinion was not issued until three years later. 
b. Whether Leon Addresses and Meets the Concerlll Raised in Guz.man 
The State next argues that Guzman is incorrect in its assertion that the Leon good faith 
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exception is inimical to the values of exclusion unrelated to police deterrence. However, the 
State;s argument confuses the issue. The State contends that Leon addressed the issues in 
Guzman and detennined that such issues, while not unimportant or unfounded, did not require 
suppression when considered in a cost-benefit analysis. Guzman, however, states that this is 
exactly where Leon is incorrect, and that the Idaho Supreme Court thus exercised its right to 
independently scrutinize and evaluate claims under the Idaho Constitution. 
Guzman extensively considered Leon and its progeny when determining whether the Idaho 
Constitution independently justified adoption of the good faith exception. Guzman held that 
Leon's holding was only reached due to the Supreme Court's narrow justification for the 
exclusionary rule--deterrence of police misconduct. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 992J 842 P.2d at 671. 
Listing its five basic purposes for believing exclusion to be a proper remedy, the Court found that 
Leon was simply too narrow to accommodate the interests of the Idaho Constitution: 
Additionally, we disagree with the basic premise of the Leon decision-that the decision 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule should be made by detennining whether the goal of 
police deterrence would be furthered in the case at bar-because it totally fails to take into 
account the other purposes of our independent state exclusionary rule. We believe, regardless 
of whether the goal of police deterrence would be served, that the other purposes of the state 
exclusionary rule justify application of the rule in evezy case where evidence is seized 
pursuant to a warrant which is not supported by a showing of probable cause. In this regard, 
we are in agreement with some of the states which have rejected the good faith exception on 
state constitutional grounds. 
Id, at 993,842 P.2d at 672, citing People v .. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417,427,488 N.E.2d 451,458, 
497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 722, 370 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1988); State 
v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 126 (Vt.1991); State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 167,579 A.2d 58, 66 
(1990). Thus, while Leon held that purposes other than police deterrence existed but were 
inadequate to justify the exclusionary rule under the federal constitution, Guzman held that these 
rationales did warrant exclusion under the State Constitution, thereby rejecting Leon's cost· 
IO 
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Additionally, there are undertones in the State's argument that the Idaho Constitution should 
mirror federal law, because the federal courts have already decided the issue. However, "[i]t is by 
now beyond dispute that [the Idaho Supreme Court] is free to interpret the state constitution as 
more protective of the rights ofldaho citizens than the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the federal constitution. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 987, 842 P.2d at 666, citing 
Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 441 U.S. 74, 80-82, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040-41, 64 L.Ed.2d 
741 (1980). Therefore, the Guzman court did not misapply state and federal law, and diligently 
explained its deviance from the federal exclusion adopted in Leon. 
3. Whether Suppression of Evidence Would be Improper Under Idaho's Exclusionary 
Rule 
The State claims that none of the rationales set forth for the exclusionary rule in Guzman are 
present in this case, and therefore suppression is improper even under Guzman. As noted above, 
Guzman sets forth five justifications for its holding that no good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies in Idaho: 
l) provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable 
government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining 
evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the 
judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation by considering evidence which has 
been obtained through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial integrity. 
Id at 672, 842 P.2d at 993. Here, the search and seizure were not, in and of themselves, 
unreasonable. Nor is there any deterrent rationale served with regard to police conduct, in that 
officers acted lawfully and in good faith reliance upon the warrant However, the other three 
interests would likely be served by suppression. 
The warrant was invalid, and officers obtained evidence of a crime against the Defendant 
solely because the invalid warrant existed. As such, this is the exact situation in which Guzman 
11 
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intended to interject the policies of ensuring thoroughness in the warrant issuing process (such as 
determining whether the court bas jurisdiction to issue a warrant), and ensuring that the judiciary 
does not commit an additional constitutional violation by allowing the admission of evidence 
obtained as the direct result of an invalid warrant (here, the metharnphetamine). Judicial integrity 
is also setved: "[t]he criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing 
can destroy a government more quickly that its failure to obseJVe its own laws, or worse, its 
disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio, 361 U.S. 643, 659, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 
1694, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Guzman is the law of this state. Therefore, a number of the 
Guzman rationales are met by suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the invalid warrant 
herein. 
While the State correctly concludes that the exclusionary rule would not apply under the 
U.S. Constitution, Guzman is clear in its holding that the Idaho Constitution cannot support a 
good faith exception because it encompasses and recognizes greater protections served by the 
exclusionazy rule. Guzman reaches this authority based in part on state law and in part on federal 
law, showing Idaho's independence in modifying and creating state constitutional law, Idaho's 
adherence to Fourth.Amendment jurisprudence in the early 20th Century, and Idaho's shift away 
from federal constitutional principles as the United States Supreme Court generated Leon's good 
faith exception. Under Idaho law and the policies announced in Guzman, a number of interests 
are served to justify the Court's denial of Leon's good faith exception. 
ORDER: 
The court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HERBY ORDERED, as follows: 























l. That Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby GRANTED. 
DATED: Tue _3Jday of ¾ · , 2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J.L day of 0]~ u I t , 2010, I caused, to be served. 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document as dressed to: 




Attorney for Defendant 
Fax: 208~667-8292 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNER COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS. 
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TO: RANDY PAUL KOIVU, THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, 
LINDA PAYNE, BONNER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, 1034 N. 
THIRD STREET, STE. 9, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the 
above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS, entered 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
l 'd El v 'ON 
-(pJ·-
AIG~!~J N39 ANll~ 01 
I 
in the above-entitled action on the 1st day of September 2010, The Honorable 
Benjamin R. Simpson presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable 
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(7}, l.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district 
court erred in suppressing evidence found incident to arrest on warrant of 
attachment. 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been 
seared. 
5. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript: Appellant does not request any transcripts. 
6. Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, 
I.A.R. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each 




Kootenai County District Court 
PO Box 9000, 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
VALERIE LARSON 
Court Reporter 
Bonner County District Court 
215 S. 1$1 Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
NOTICE OF APPEAL· 2 
£ l v 'ON "-~v-Ala~:~J N39 ANl1V 01 ~dso:v Oloc·t.·d3S 
(b) That arrangements have been made with the Bonner County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office which will be responsible for paying for the 
reporter's transcript; 
( c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee 
for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant 
(Idaho Code§ 31-3212); 
(d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in 
a criminal case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8)); 
( e) That service is being made upon all parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A. R. 
; 'd 
DATED this 17th day of September 2010. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of September 2010, caused 
a true and correct copy of the attached NOrlCE OF APPEAL to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN R. SIMPSON 
Kootenai County District Court 
PO Box 9000, 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
SHANE GREENBANK 
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office 
227 S. 1st Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
LINDA PAYNE 
Bonner County Public Defender's Office 
1034 N. Third Street, STE. 9, 
Coeur D'Alene, Idaho 83814 
HAND DELIVERY 
MR. STEPHEN W. KENYON 
CLERK OF THE COURTS 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/pm 
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SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 38106 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
VS 
RANDY PAUL KOIVU, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
_________ ) 
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do certify that the foregoing Record in this cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of 
the pleadings and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28. 
IN WITN/S'{ WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this day of December, 2010. 
MARIESCOTI 
Clerk of the District Court 
·>-
• r- :: 
Clerk's Certificate 
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RANDY PAUL KOIVU, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 38106 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is offered as 
the Clerk's exhibit on appeal: 
Notice to Defendants filed March 9, 2010 
Criminal and Driving Record Report filed March 12, 2010 (Confidential) 
Authority in Support of Motion to Suppress filed July 9, 2010 
Stipulation to Vacate Status Conference filed July 20, 2010 
Stipulations for Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Supress filed August 19, 2010 
Stipulation to Forego Oral Argument on Defendant's Motion to Suppress filed 
August 30, 2010 
IN WITNESS WHEREO~ave hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this --1.!f- day of . , i~()-{.'-',2010. 
Marie Scott 
Clerk of the District Court 
Certificate Of Exhibits 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






SHAWN THOMAS WHEELER, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) _________ ) 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 38106 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United 
Parcel Service, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of Record in this 
cause as follows: 
LA WREN CE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
MOLLY HUSKEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0005 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this __ day of December, 2010. 
Marie Scott 
Clerk of the District Court 
Certificate of Service 
